Being and the dialectics of irony: A reading of some of Milan Kundera's novels
1.

Exordium: Art and irony
In this essay I shall read Milan Kundera as an artist who has something to say on the subject o f being. Here, in the exordium it is perhaps important to say something not about what Kundera says, but rather about how he says it. By discussing the how o f Kundera's writing, we are trying to establish the outline o f a meta-theoretical account o f how the subject of being is presented.
Kundera presents the subject o f being through the medium o f irony. Irony, as the term is used here, is not merely a trope, but a veritable mode o f understanding. But to see how irony can become a mode o f understanding, we must link it to its historico-philosophical heritage.
More than anyone else, it was Friedrich von Schlegel who introduced the term irony into modem literary theory. It is the aim o f the artist to present the reader with the world in its essence.2 But, for Schlegel, as for Fichte, the ego is the absolute principle o f all knowing and understanding. This means that everything that is understood or conceived to be true, is done so, purely by the instrumentality o f the ego. Every idea that is thus created by the ego, can be destroyed by the ego and so cannot have any value in itself. W hat the artist does, is to build up an artistic illusion, only to annihilate it by revealing the artist to be the arbitrary creator o f this illusion. The ego can only acknowledge its own subjectivity; the rest is mere illusion, created by the ego. The ego's response towards the reality it has created can only be one o f irony.
But this ironic stance is hard to bear and there always remains the need for objective reality. The artist can only have an ambivalent attitude towards the world and attempt to curb the struggle between the absolute and the relative by employing irony. So, there exists, in the artist, simultaneously the need to give a complete account o f reality and a consciousness o f its impossibility. With this dichotomy in mind, the artist cannot submerge herself in her work. To constantly take account o f the flux between absolute and relative, she has to stand detached from her work, hovering above it in a state o f detachment and superiority.
What remains, is only the artist's subjectivity which can attach itself to nothing (because o f the ironic stance) and thus becomes empty. Yet, as we have seen, it constantly yearns to be filled with some absolute, but this proves to be impossible as everything that is not ego or subjectivity itself, is recognised, organised and thus created or annihilated by the ego.
Nevertheless Schlegel still envisages a world that can be comprehended. O f course this comprehension cannot take place in a direct fashion, but rather in the flux between truth and its destruction by irony. The world is constituted in this to and fro movement o f creation and ironic unmasking.
2 See Szondi's article on Schlegel's romantic irony (Szondi, 1985) .
In twentieth century literature we see a definite consciousness o f the annihilating function of irony. Modernity's search for the essence o f being is characterised by a recognition o f incoherence. The world we experience is depicted in terms o f its unintelligibility. There exists an ironic distance between the artist's attempts at making reality coherent and her knowledge that the world does not present itself in a coherent fashion. Thus modernity simultaneously attempts to be true to this incoherence and to transcend it. In this way we see that in Joyce and Woolf, the dichotomy between coherence and incoherence is not so much resolved as thrown into aesthetic shape. The paradoxes are not solved, but unified by form, which transcends it.
But in modernist writing we still perceive the belief in a deeper level of truth, a universal meaning which is not completely dependent upon the creative function o f the artist, but may be comprehended by the artist. In W oolf we see a manifestation o f this possibility o f truth in her idea of moments o f vision and in Joyce the possibility is lodged in the idea o f an epiphany. What remains through the existence o f the aestheticising function o f the artist and these moments o f 'lucidity', is a very strong sense o f the artist as creator o f meaning. Here, in modernism, there are still strong traces o f the ego and Schlegel's subjectivity standing back in a privileged position -adjudicating, if not creating appearances.
What still conspicuously remains in modernist writing is the belief in the unironised subject which is situated in the artist. The artist, through the process o f aestheticization and certain moments o f lucidity, still possesses the power to transform what seems to be inherently fragmented, into a comprehensible whole. Much o f the detached aloofness o f Schlegel's artist still remains intact. There is the nostalgia for unity and a basic understanding that this unity is lost and yet there is a persistent adherence to the belief that the artist, through the process o f creation, can transcend it and supply what is needed for our understanding of the world and o f being.
I am arguing that irony and ironising in Schlegel, as well as in modernism, stops short o f the creative subject. Irony, as we have described it up to now, has very little in common with the constructive irony one associates with the Socratic method. There irony functions as a basis for new in sights. Irony, as Socrates employs it, always assumes that whatever is demolished by it, will presently be replaced with a new understanding. The irony o f modernism is much more destructive and the understanding we gain is based on something as volatile as the insights o f the creative subject. And yet, we still have, at least, the creative subject, who has become much more important, viewed in the light o f the diminishing value o f all other certainties.
In postmodern literature this last vestige o f truth and order seems to vanish. Irony is taken all the way and is now also allowed to erase the traces o f the artist. Kundera creates different possibilities o f being. The reader is never confronted by what she is, but rather by what she could be. The possibilities are infinite and the reader receives answers to the problem, only to see these answers being ironised and annihilated. The laughter we, however, hear when all has been ironised, is no longer the laughter o f the creating subject, but the laughter o f true and uncompro mising irony which shatters reader and author alike.
It is with this view o f postmodern irony that we shall read the novels o f Milan Kundera in order to see what he says about being. We shall thus run two processes simultaneously in this reading. The first is a quasitheoretical attempt to establish Kundera's idea o f being. The other will be an attempt to show how the meta-theoretical content we have just been describing is manifested in the novels themselves.
2.
Note to the reader Whenever we ask questions about being and the self, we, as philosophers, immediately turn to other philosophers in order to find answers. Perhaps we assume that we are most likely to learn something from philosophers because their work is firstly well structured and argued. Secondly we know that they set out with the idea o f providing answers to questions.
What I aim to do in this essay, is to examine the work o f a novelist, namely Milan Kundera. I initially set out by posing only one question. The question was formulated in philosophical terms and it read as follows: 'What is being?' I, however, did not find an answer to this question in the novels that I read. Instead I ended up with an answer to another question which reads as follows: 'How is being?' or more conventionally, 'What is being like?'
Not being a philosopher, Kundera never sets out to answer the first question and therefore we should not be surprised at the outcome o f our study. He does answer the second question and he does so in the mode of description. He does not argue for or against a certain conception o f what being is, but rather provides us with a description o f what being is like. In every novel he answers the same question by a redescription o f being. Kundera makes his view o f being seem plausible by describing human action.
In 'showing' us being by using the mode o f description, Kundera is doing nothing that alienates his writing from other novels. All novels (the most didactic of them excluded) set out to show a world with which the reader is confronted and invited to join or oppose. In the dialectic between the reader's world and the novel's world, a new world comes into existencea world in which the reader suddenly finds himself revealed. 
3.
Being and the death of God
In this section we read The Joke (1982) as a novel which reverberates with the death o f God. We read the book as a finger (the author's writing hand) pointing into the distance where we perceive only the absence o f an horizon, a world that has been unchained ... and so on.
The essence o f The Joke is transgression. Transgression is the overstep ping o f bounds, the breaking o f new ground, or perhaps, as we shall see, a fall into groundlessness. As we trace the moments o f transgression in this novel, we find that transgression takes place on many sites and that it is usually governed by laughter. But the laughter that, here, serves as governing principle, has nothing in common with frivolous humour. In The Joke we find the laughter o f loss and bitterness. This laughter is activated by irony and cynicism.
So, in concluding these opening remarks, we can summarise: W hat we find in this novel is nothing but absence (whose principal metaphor is the death o f God), initially generated by the act o f transgression and which is in turn accomplished by laughter which finds its roots in the sombre twins, irony and cynicism.
But why is this laughter so savage? The fall into the void is bom o f the dichotomy between two worlds. In the one world Ludvic understands the mechanisms o f irony. He is able to laugh. In the other, we find totalita rian humourlessness. The serious face o f totalitarian politics is equated with the grave mask o f religion. " [N] o great movement designed to change the world can bear to be laughed at or belittled. Mockery is a rust that corrodes all it touches" (Kundera, 1982:203) . The void which is laughter opens there where the recognition o f absence, transience, and contingency meet the wall o f certainty.
This dichotomy also forms the political dimension o f the book. If we, however, are to understand the book and what it says about being, we are forced to go beyond politics, beyond the critique o f totalitarianism. This political dimension is present throughout the novel and yet, its most distinctive voice is heard in the earlier parts o f the novel. Let us for the sake o f clarity divide the novel into two parts, or rather, two concerns. In the first, Ludvic sends a postcard to his girl friend. This postcard, which reads as follows: "Optimism is the opium o f the people! A healthy atmo sphere stinks o f stupidity! Long live Trotsky!" (Kundera, 1982:26) , offends the party's sensibilities. Ludvic's laughter has to face the humourless wall o f totalitarianism. His initial laughter, after writing the message, is engendered by his sexual longing for the girl. The postcard is nothing but a retaliation against her sexual passivity and her unwillingness to transgress the boundaries o f the sexual. Ludvic's retaliation is political in form, but sexual in nature. Notwithstanding this obvious incongruity, which provokes laughter on the reader's side, Ludvic is sent to work in the mines. His double-edged laughter (which has now been forced to take on both a political and a sexual face), which follows his transgression, leads him into a state o f nothingness. He now lives in the absence o f freedom, love, and his own personal history. In this way, laughter engenders loss.
But this form o f transgression, its resultant absences and its political implications, is only a part o f what Kundera has to reveal. For, as we have said at the outset, he will reveal to us the death o f God -the most profound emptiness.
The second part o f the novel deals with Ludvic's retaliation and revenge. His fighting back takes the form o f a transgression o f social and sexual norms. He intends to sleep with Helena, the wife o f his one-time judge and executioner. In cuckolding him, Ludvic will attempt to overcome the emptiness created by the ironic outcome o f his joke. He will turn the irony, once directed at him, against his enemy.
We, however, have to ask: What has become o f the postcard? It is important to note that, in Ludvic's mind, the postcard is now divested of its humorous element. As it was the sole creator o f his fall into absence, it has become serious. It seems to have taken on a constitutive role in Ludvic's life. He can no longer laugh at its contents, for that laughter would dismantle him completely. The postcard, in short, has become heavy. It loses its meaninglessness and becomes a token o f Ludvic's individuality. (The token, that which stands for something else is always filled with significance and cannot contend with the annihilation brought about by laughter.) It takes on the meaning o f a statement which conquers the dissembling o f the self which is the ultimate goal o f homogenisation. The postcard makes Ludvic an individual and thus heavy.
Ludvic is in need o f something to laugh at, something at which he can direct irony, as it has been directed at him. The enemy's wife becomes that solid object. He is ready to transgress against norms and to reap the rich constitutional laughter o f his own ironic creation. But again the joke is on him. Husband and wife have long since stopped caring for each other and readily tolerate infidelity. The proposedly heavy irony turns against Ludvic and in the same motion, becomes light with the sound of laughter. His laughter is, once more, not directed at an object, a system, an enemy, but at himself. Now laughter is again destructive. In the instant that laughter consumes him, Ludvic experiences a moment of weightlessness (Kundera, 1982:210) . He becomes a dissolving image, a desolate landscape with no footprints, no heavy traces o f presence.
What, precisely did Ludvic have in mind when he slept with Helena? He had wanted to cross the boundary o f the present and change the lightness o f the past. Revenge takes the form o f a looking back that tries to capture and alter what has been. But, in crossing this divide, Ludvic finds that he has again become the object o f a joke.
He happens to come across members o f the new generation o f revolution aries. They now form the party at which his anger is directed. He comes to understand that the postcard (which, as we shall remember, had by this time taken on the heaviness o f meaning for Ludvic) has become, for them, a mere joke. What has become for Ludvic the token o f his revolt, his very individuality, is now merely smiled at and tolerated. His initial trans gression loses its importance at the very same moment when he discovers his impotence to make a heavy indentation on the past. Yet he had suffered defeat and humiliation for it. The laughter directed at him, dilutes his past, makes it watery and insignificant. His past treats him like a stranger (Kundera, 1982:236) . He understands the desolation created by this lack o f historical solidness when he reflects that:
... most people willingly deceive themselves with a doubly false faith; they believe in eternal memory ... and in rectification ... Both are sham. The truth lies at the opposite end o f the scale: everything will be forgotten and nothing will be rectified. All rectification (both vengeance and forgiveness) will be taken over by oblivion. No one will rectify wrongs; all wrongs will be forgotten (Kundera, 1982:245) .
And so we take leave o f a world in which being becomes a void -there is nothing to refer to, no history, no love, only irony which gives way to the laughter that demolishes.
In this novel we are introduced to what could be called the 'dialectics of irony'. Seriousness is constantly being undermined. When one examines concepts such as being and the self, one is constantly aware o f the fact that some measure o f seriousness is necessary if one is to go about it constructively at all. Seriousness is the ground for our contemplation of these matters. Kundera starts o ff by setting up a series o f situations in which he creates (in the reader) this seriousness, this groundedness and then he suddenly confronts the reader with a situation which is juxtaposed with what has gone before in such a way that it undermines the seriousness and evokes laughter. But this ironic laughter has a very specific character. It is not the frivolous laughter elicited by a funny situation, but rather the near hysterical laughter evoked by a sense o f loss. One comes to see, in the moment o f irony, that whatever had been deemed serious, cannot be serious. But the laughter we are forced into with this recognition is not careless, but filled with care for what had been lost -precisely because what had been lost had been dear to us. It was dear to us by virtue o f the fact that it provided the ground on which we stood. Laughter, in this sense, robs us o f any firm footing.
4.
Life is Elsewhere (1986) -The poetry of suspicion3
Do we not covet the lives o f those young romantic lyrical poets who die young, in an explosion o f passion, after having lived life to the hilt? But surely our envy is not so easily aroused, and a life so lived cannot be enough to give birth to the tinge o f resentment we feel when reading about their lives. What attracts us is not only their lives, but their linguistic revelry in creating and understanding a form o f deep truth. We suspect them o f understanding the truth o f being. Because we harbour this suspicion, we find it possible to understand arguments such as those Gadamer uses to make us believe that art reveals the truth of reality.
It should be obvious that this address is not directed to those who do not suspect poetry in this way. For them Kundera's musings on being and poetry could only be a story which they have read and by which they have remained untouched. This novel can never 'work' for them. If Kundera's novel 'works' at all, it does so because the reader believes in poetry; sus pects it o f containing some sort o f truth.
Is there not something mystical and deep about poetry's relation to our inner existence? It is indeed the raw, concise expression o f being.
In the novel, Life is Elsewhere, Jaromil comes to believe that he is one o f the elect, that Truth has chosen his pen as her lyre and that he understands truth, because he is sensitive to her beguiling voice. We are forced to laugh at his presumptions, which become ridiculous in the face o f his inexperience. We have to laugh at the sham that is his poetry, the lie he calls his inner being. Together with Kundera (for he leads us into this trap as we read on) we ironise the young poet's inability to become part o f the real world. Our laughter is filled with derision. We come to believe that Jaromil lives in the mirrored house o f poetry and that his truth is removed
In this section I am much indebted to the insights o f Francois Ricard (1991 from true being. We come to understand him as an ersatz poet who will never reach the truth in the way Rimbaud did.
The reader, however, slowly comes to understand that Jaromil is, indeed, gifted and that his poetry is not o f the worst kind. The reader is forced into a comer from which he must rethink and question his own evaluation o f poetry. Exactly what is it that makes good poetry good? Perhaps the reader, in his laughter, had up to this point suspected that he was one of the elect, one who could fathom true being, by understanding good poetry. His laughter is slowly infiltrated by doubt. Kundera (1986:271) has set a trap for "snaring Rimbaud, Lermontov, lyricism and youth". At first it was possible to play o ff our hero, Rimbaud, against his false antithesis, Jaromil. Now we understand that those two poets are one and that Kundera flogs the one as he does the other. By virtue o f what judgement were we laughing at an earlier stage in the novel? At that point Rimbaud was still authentic, our own inner experience was still authentic, but now we seem to sense the void Kundera has led us into and as we look around us, we perceive nothing but our own hollow laugh, fading and then turning against ourselves.
Are we touched by Jaromil's life? Undoubtedly. He is at once comic and monstrous. We cannot ignore this latter part o f him. In the beginning he was ineffectual in the realm o f reality, as he was in poetry, but now he has sentenced a man to death and a woman to imprisonment. We can no longer laugh derisively; the moment has come to judge. We cannot but condemn him and his poetry. Jaromil, Lermontov, Pushkin, Rimbaud, all poetry becomes monstrous as Kundera leads us through their biographies. Poetry stands unmasked and if it forms a part o f our being, it is a dark part -not truthful, but deceitful.
How do we finally understand this unmasking? Kundera's novel is written in a poetic style. He has not drawn us into the world o f poetry by using ordinary language, he drew us into poetry by using poetry. Our suspicion o f poetry has come full circle. The search for truth has ended in deceit. All that remains is Kundera's laughter, but he cannot be laughing at us, after all, he is the poet. That hollow laugh must be directed at himself.
Characters, readers, author -all have been demolished by irony. The book implodes into nothingness and so does being, which is its subject.
In this novel, the 'dialectics o f irony' is once again at work, but this time, playing its game on an even more intimate level with the reader and the author. This book 'works' because o f the readers' assumptions about poetry and truth. The reader keeps looking for this truth and in so doing, sides with the authorial voice in condemning Jaromil. The reader, how ever, is betrayed by the author -he makes laughable that which we had believed. But just as soon as we reconfigure and set ourselves in action against the ironising betrayal o f the author, the text itself betrays the author and silences his laughter, so that the reader finds himself incapable of defending his position against anyone. The text itself is finally betrayed by poetry, which has in turn been ironised by the author. In this circle o f betrayal, the reader finds himself in the void o f laughter which takes the place o f his seriousness.
Being, laughter, and forgetting
How can we examine being through the oddly juxtaposed couple o f laughter and forgetting? What connects them to being and to each other?
With the act o f laughter, as with the act o f forgetting, the crossing o f a boundary, a border occurs. Crossing the line that divides remembering and forgetting, seriousness and laughter, constitutes an entering into the world o f meaninglessness and death. To no longer remember ourselves is to transgress the borders o f being. Without the thick innards which is memory, the body becomes an empty shell and a mere perpetual movement without direction and reason.
The struggle for control over the future, says Kundera, is merely a struggle for attaining power over the past. Once one has power over the past, one can command the meaning or non-meaning o f the future. The cut-andpaste action o f memory shapes the past. If that memory is faulty, it makes mistakes, and these mistakes have the characteristics o f irony which gives rise to laughter. With the act o f forgetting, laughter gets to govern the meaning o f the present.
Kundera discusses two kinds o f laughter -each indicating an opposing metaphysical presupposition. The laughter o f angels describes the kind of laughter that embodies happiness and optimism. This is the laughter of lyricism which leads the laughing being to believe in the truth o f well being. This is (also) the fanatic laughter o f totalitarianism, o f religion, and o f true faith in the future. This laughter is in cahoots with forgetting; it edits the past so as to fit in with its presuppositions.
Opposing this mode o f laughter, we find the devilish laughter o f nothing ness. This is the laughter o f memory, the memory o f senseless repetition. This laughter is propped up by the metaphysics o f nothingness. To believe in something is to be serious. Devilish laughter undercuts all seriousness. This laughter demolishes the seriousness o f sexual intercourse and funerals -it does so by appropriating the mechanisms o f irony. This is the laughter that says: 'We are engaged in this (or that) action, but we understand that what we do, is nothing.' In short, it is the laughter o f absurdity.
Real humour constitutes the harmony o f being and nothingness and thus it lies somewhere between these two extremes. Kundera tells us that the wisdom o f the novel does not lie in proposing answers, but rather in juxtaposing questions. (In this case he means to juxtapose the two forms o f laughter without either o f them dominating the other.)
But we have to ask whether Kundera is not lying. Is the reader equally effected by the two forms o f laughter -metaphysical totalitarianism and metaphysical nihilism?
The Book o f Laughter and F orgetting (1980) ends with the melancholy of this last transgression. A meeting o f the meaningful with the meaningless and the laughter o f nothingness closes the scene. A certain fear lies in the recognition o f nothingness, a certain impotence and negation. Kundera, remembering his prescripts for the novel, could not throw his whole weight behind this laughter. But is this laughter not endlessly preferable to the laughter o f all-ness, the all-encompassing laughter o f angels which commands one to join them -and in failing to do so, we are demolished? This is the strength o f Kundera's political analyses. They do not only condemn totalitarian politics, but also totalitarian metaphysics, wherever it rears its head. Kundera constantly evokes the laughter o f angels, but when he joins in the laughter, he is no doubt laughing the laughter o f the devil.
What then o f the laughter o f true being, the laughter that governs the middle ground that does not degenerate into either o f the extremes? Does it not remain a possibility? I think not, for those who understand humour, know that humour always undercuts what is serious, what is endowed with meaning. In the intoxication o f laughter, there remains no place for meaning and humour slides helplessly, irrevocably into the excess o f the devil's laughter.
This seems to be the function o f the 'dialectics o f irony': It creates the possibility o f seriousness only to subvert it again. Let us for a moment be serious about the laughter o f angels. It is not the laughter o f loss, but the laughter o f certainty, the same laughter that constitutes truth. This truth is ultimately serious. The laughter o f angels is simply seriousness existing incognito. Kundera, once again, sets up the possibility for 'something' to exist. Perhaps, he says, there is a position midway between something and nothing. But the laughter o f the devil undercuts this possibility. All the possibilities we are offered end up being ironised and so destroyed.
We laugh with Kundera, for his laughter is catching. But before long, we find that his humour has led us to the opening o f the void. The void opens there where we laugh in excess o f ourselves, where we forget ourselves, where what remains, is not being, but purely laughter. We describe the laughter o f irony by saying that it is light, it defies heaviness, it resists being drawn into heaviness.
Being and lightness
What characterizes being? Being, we are told, is above all characterized by lightness. This 'lightness' has two possible binary opposites. The first and most obvious o f these, is heaviness. To this meaning, we shall return shortly. The title o f the book, The Unbearable Lightness o f Being (1984) , leads us away from the opposite o f lightness which is darkness. None theless it is in the reflection o f light that Tereza sees her body, the same light in which Tomas sees the dissimilarities o f his lovers's movements and bodies. This light illuminates action. Thus, through this crack in the meaning o f lightness, in this disparity o f opposites, we see that being is also action. The novelist has to show us the actions o f his characters in order to show us the meaning o f being. Their acts become the backdrop, the active scene from which the themes o f the novel emanate.
O f course the themes o f this novel revolve around the primary meaning o f lightness, a concept which stands in opposition to the word heaviness. This lightness, as we have just seen at the end o f the previous section, is found in laughter and irony. It is the laughter that resounds over the absence o f meaning. But lightness, in the sense o f laughter, is not an action that establishes itself. It is a re-action. It is an act performed in reaction to whatever is experienced. From the start, the lightness o f being is not an assertion, it is an open possibility -the possibility that finds its existence in a choice. The lightness o f being is thus not a pre-meditated answer to the question 'What is being?', but a problem stated in the form o f a possibility that becomes possible only by the active choice o f a human being.
Once again we hear Kundera saying that the novel does not provide answers, but merely different possibilities.4 So far we seem to have come to the conclusion that Kundera favours some possibilities over others. The outcome o f the argument is, however o f no crucial importance -the argument provides us with a way o f reading, nothing more. It is the path we have chosen, and it should be obvious that if it were today a windy and cloudy day, we might have chosen another. Thus the specific path is not all-important. W hat is important, is that we walk it. This assures the reader and the writer that we are making progress, which is naturally a lie, because we understand that we are performing an action (in this case we are walking down a specific path), not in order to reach a destination, but merely for the sake o f the movement, which confers meaning on our reading.
Being is light because it is devoid o f repetition. Only through repetition can our acts become solid. We live our lives but once and therefore it be comes light and meaningless. This is the lightness o f irony, for we under stand that we are performing in a rehearsal for which there will be no opening night. We are confronted with the idiom Einrnal ist keinmal.
Nietzsche makes his demon ask us the heaviest question o f all (see Nietzsche, 1965) . The question wants to know how we would react to life if it were infinitely heavy, if we lived our lives again and again, each life the perfect mirror o f the previous one. Nietzsche indicates that a life filled to the brim with heaviness, becomes the most impossible o f all tasks.
For an exposition o f Kundera's own understanding on this form o f contingency, see
The Art of the Novel (1988) .
Kundera deftly inverts the question. It now reads as follows: 'How would you react if your life were only to be the faint outline o f a sketch that will never be completed -a figure that will never be solid enough to cast a shadow?' Kundera sets out to show us, through the actions o f his charac ters, the possible answers that might come to us as we live our lives. I say again that Kundera 'presents' us with these possibilities, but that these possibilities do not exist without active choice -decisive actions.
Tereza and Tomas meet each other as the result o f a multitude o f chance circumstances. There is nothing heavy about their meeting. It results from a superior's illness, Beethoven, an open book, and a glass o f cognac. How is it possible that this chance encounter eventually results in Beethoven's heavy refrain "Ess muss sein. Ess muss sein"? Having read the pages of the last novel, the reader cocks his head and strains his ear for the echo of a dying god, for the laughter that is about to erupt from the lightness (the Einmal ist keinmal) o f being. It is still natural for us to draw a straight upward-slanting line through the separate works of an author. We wait for the reworking o f an old theme. Here, in this novel, the theme is undoubtedly still audible, in fact, it is the first thing we hear when we pick up the book. Yet, suddenly the unmistakable Ess muss sein establishes a counterpoint to the lightness and we cannot ignore it for another moment.
To trace the origins o f this Ess muss sein, we may choose to follow the actions o f any one o f the main characters o f the novel (Tomas, Sabina, Franz, Tereza). I shall follow Tomas. His Ess muss sein, his heaviness, is the will to be a doctor, specifically, a surgeon. It has always been his destiny. But the word destiny rings false. This heaviness has very little to do with a cosmic plan and everything to do with individual choice. Tomas follows his Ess muss sein to Switzerland and there he lives his life as he must. But our actions are more complicated than this and Kundera indicates that our choices, even though they be the outcome o f contingency and lightness, may lose this characteristic lightness. The lightness that was once his chance encounter with Tereza, has become heavy. It has gained weight by his choice and by his love for her. When she returns to Prague, her heaviness drags him down and he follows her. In Prague he is faced with the dichotomy between the Ess muss sein o f his profession on the one hand and on the other, the lightness which he bestows on politics.
He is forced to retract the negative statements against the party in order to keep on working as a surgeon -to follow his initial E ss muss sein. His refusal to do so seems to indicate a choice for lightness -against his profession and against the heaviness o f totalitarian politics.
But we know already that this decision does not lead him away from heaviness, it leads him to Tereza, his other Ess muss sein. His choice against politics places him, for a moment in limbo between lightness and heaviness. His life without his profession is light, his life with Tereza, heavy.
Why this affirmation o f heaviness in the one case and not in the other? The answer is not as obvious as it seems. It is not the choice o f a woman above a profession, which seems to be the only natural human choice. This choice becomes a writer's problem. Kundera is trying to solve the problem o f being and weight.
In the previous novels we have seen him choosing for lightness, laughter and nothingness. Here Kundera seems to leave us with true ambiguity instead o f an answer. This novel verges on the ambiguous. We find no clear choice between lightness and heaviness at the end o f the story. Kundera merely presents us with possibilities. In his latest novel, Im m ortality (1991) , I see a rever sion to the choice for absolute lightness. The U nbearable Lightness o f Being seems to constitute the only breather in this author's works. This is the only novel in which the devilish laughter that leads to nothingness is not constantly audible.
Being and death
Let us read Imm ortality (1991) by unravelling the following statement: Being has the weight o f an image, a gesture.
All characters, says Kundera, contains a basis, a reason, a Grund which is the cause o f its actions. Without grasping this basis, one cannot under stand the person, or what motivates him to act. This Grund, he is further convinced, "has the nature o f a metaphor" (Kundera, 1991:265) .
We are concerned with the question, 'What is being?' or 'What is called being?'; this is the question we are asking Kundera to answer.
From the beginning we are made to understand that being too has its Grund in a metaphor, the metaphor o f an image or a gesture.
To under stand what being is, it follows that we have to understand the meaning or value o f an image or gesture.
As we have seen in the previous section, the meaning o f being is deter mined by its weight. If it is true that the basis o f being resides in an image or a gesture, we have to determine the possible weight o f that image in order to be able to attach a value to it.
For these reasons we start with the statement: Being has the weight o f an image or a gesture. By defining the meaning o f this statement, we are attempting to answer the question: 'What is being?'
Following the dictates o f the text to a certain degree, we shall not attempt to homogenize the thematic nuances under which Kundera scrutinizes being, but rather attempt to find being, as the author presents it, in diffe rent places and in different circumstances.
In The Unbearable Lightness o f Being we have traced a rather ambiguous answer to much the same question. Perhaps Kundera is ready to rid his novel o f that ambiguity now, because it is, after all, difficult to perceive a moment o f ambiguity when one is faced with the heaviness o f undeniable mortality.
Shortly before her death, Agnes uses this image to outline being: "Being: becoming a fountain, a fountain on which the universe falls like a warm rain" (Kundera, 1991:288) . This image traces, what Bataille (1988:xi) calls "the desire to be everything, to identify with the entirety o f the universe". It is an image which outlines a desire for expansion, a wish to embrace the all. Simultaneously this desire to encompass space is also a wish to embrace all time. For being to become the all-encompassing, it has to embrace time in its entirety. In this image, we meet face-to-face, the desire for immortality. This image (which becomes breathtaking and climactic by dint o f its sheer magnitude) is shattered by a seemingly small chance occurrence. Agnes and her desire are both erased by the figure o f a girl sitting in the middle o f the road. The only response we can show to the dichotomy that exists between her desire and the transitoriness o f the image she assigns to being, is melancholy.
Perhaps, then, mortality undercuts the heaviness o f being and turns it into something light and ephemeral. But being in its essence remains to be examined; being devoid o f its inevitable telos (which makes it light). If we catch the image o f being before it vanishes, it might turn out to possess some weight after all.
But, in turning our back on death, we inevitably face birth. Agnes, we learn, is bom out o f an image, a gesture. She is, however, unable to fill that image with herself and so, unable to make it heavy. This inability follows from the fact that the gesture from which she is bom, is not unique to her. Kundera observes a woman performing a gesture with her hand when she greets someone. That image, that gesture is the basis from which Agnes is bom. In no way does Agnes's defining feature, the ges ture, become her own, it may be used by anyone. Kundera (1991:8) aphorizes the problem: "Many people, few gestures" (8). Agnes dies, but her gesture carries on. At the end o f the novel her sister has fully appropriated her gesture and the gesture, which once signified Agnes's Grund, becomes only a parody o f what she once was. The image o f that gesture becomes weightless in its transposability. It always reveals the same meaning and yet in this case, designates another, opposing being.
We take our gestures and our faces, for that matter, to represent our core selves. That is after all what helps us get over the initial jolt o f having been thrown into this world. Now this comforting assumption has to be questioned. As Agnes browses through a magazine, she comes to under stand that the freedom o f photography has lead to the demise o f identity and o f difference. Agnes understands that the face, with its features reproduced in a million other faces cannot contain traces o f the self -the self, to be just that, has to be heavier than the reproduced images of modem photography. It is clear that being can be constituted from otherness. Thus Agnes attempts to escape sameness. To become oneself and only that, one must be capable o f becoming other. But Agnes keeps seeing herself in others, and is, finally, incapable o f being herself. The irony o f seeing those traits we have adopted for ourselves constantly being repeated in others, diminishes our own otherness and makes the boundaries o f being seem fuzzy and uncontainable. Surely a glimpse o f the truth o f being must be caught in the image o f love. This is our one true emotion. But before love can provide answers to our questions on being, it is forced to answer the question asked by Nietzsche's demon. The demon wants to know from the loving couple whether they would like to spend their lives together in the next life; and the next? Or would you prefer never to see each other again? Agnes chooses never to see Paul again. The stability o f love is an illusion -the image o f romantic lovers, for ever madly and inseparably intertwined in embrace starts burning as soon as it is confronted with its truth. The image is unmasked as feeble when it is not strong enough to sustain the 'Yes! Was that love? Then once more'. In its eternal perh aps, love becomes featherlight.
So, the self, the core o f being, has made room for the image. There is no self, but the hundreds o f selves constituted by our images in other people's eyes. Agnes does not leave Rubens, her lover, because o f something that has happened to her self. She sees her own physical image tainted and imagines him seeing her like that. Her self transposes the image it has o f itself to the image that it may form in Rubens's mind. An intricate transposition, no doubt, as much as it is a fictional transposition, but it is enough to end their erotic love story in an air o f misunderstood melancholy. A radical perspectivism underlies this episode. What governs this episode, is not a story, or even a multi-dimensional proliferation o f stories which we can at least attempt to piece together. A hundred narratives colliding would make Agnes's decision heavy and loaded with meaning. What governs this episode is rather the instantaneous flash o f the camera, a flash which takes over the entire self for that instant. The image that develops from that instant is light and almost without Grund.
Being, governed by the flash o f the camera, also has a specific social face. Being-in-the-world has given way to being-among-images. The truth o f our being is in the hands o f what Kundera calls the Imagologues. Adverti sing, opinion polls, talk-radio, the news -all these facets o f our daily lives become the creators o f the images in which we find ourselves, from which we may choose the meaning o f our lives. From these images, we are forced to deduce our social being, for we have little else to go on. When we hear that violence in the city has shown a remarkable decline in the past forty eight hours, we are bound to uncork a bottle in celebration, while next door, one's neighbour is being strangled by a mad rapist.
The images created for us by advertising have lost all the heaviness o f tragedy. We know Beethoven's Ninth not from the concert hall, but from the perfume advertisement. The images we are confronted with is no longer greater than human life, they are scaled down for consumption. For this reason alone, the heaviness o f tragedy is absent from our lives. In the world o f the imagologue, being can hardly be a serious matter.
But we cannot stand the fleetingness o f these images. We rebel against their gratuitousness, their ephemerality, their contingency. These images, which are meant to provide the Grund o f our being, are themselves weighed and found wanting. This is the gesture meant to deny contingen cy, the gesture o f longing for immortality: "she tilted her head slightly, covered her face with a vague, rather melancholy smile, placed her finger tips between her breasts and ... threw her hands forward" (Kundera, 1991:183) . This is the image o f the human self wanting to transcend itself, its own transparent image. The image o f the hands being thrown forward, contains the desire for true, heavy being. It is the desire to see being projected into the future. Being is more than being thrown into the world, it is more than being-in-the-world. It is the desire to become being-in-thefuture. Kundera, however, leaves us with the knowledge that we cannot project being into the future. The best we can do is to project an image of that being into the future. But it should be remembered that we have no control over that image, for as we have seen, it is infinitely light and subject to chance and distortion. After all, Kundera (1991:240) even makes Goethe and Hemingway say "things [they] would probably never say on [their] own".
We are left with a final metaphor. Avenarius rebels against the lightness o f the images that people consider heavy enough to describe being. His whole life, his whole being takes part in this revolt. He becomes, to the reader, a figure o f hope. But when Kundera eventually thinks up a metaphor that defines Avenarius, we are met with another metaphor which derives its absolute lightness from powerlessness and joylessness. Kundera (1991:387) describes him by saying: "You play with the world like a melancholy child who has no little brother". It becomes apparent that there is no escape from lightness, and once again this lightness becomes, for us, heavy like death. Why is Kundera so convincing about the all-pervasiveness o f irony? O f course philosophy can be convincing through the medium o f argumen tation. But when one considers the present subject, namely being, it becomes clear that it is not a subject easily argued. Both Nietzsche and Sartre (but also Heidegger) found it easier to cope with the subject matter at hand in a more or less literary fashion.
In conclusion
We may be convinced by a philosophical argument that has the possibility o f being true. But when the reader picks up a Kundera novel, he is not only confronted by what might possibly be true, but, more importantly, by characters that might be his own true possibilities. The reader identifies with the characters and so, becomes, part o f the question he is attempting to find an answer to. The more or less stable character that the reader assumes before reading the novel, is slowly subverted and turned against itself, so that the end o f the novel also entails an end to the reader. Can the reader still truly love or hate without laughing at the very act? -without losing the meaning o f the act, even as it is in progress?
It is clear that the void that is being described in terms o f irony is the representation o f what we are confronted with in postmodemity. Post modernism takes the death o f God seriously and accepts the uncertainty with which it is confronted. What should be our response towards this overpowering irony? Kundera ends his last novel by responding with a sense o f melancholy. Perhaps this is the clue that must govern our responses. Previously we could respond to our world by adopting the emotion o f nostalgia, an emotion that is constantly lamenting a great loss without fully accepting that loss. That was the answer o f modernity. Now that we can more fully comprehend our inability to recover certainty, we are left, in the aftermath, with melancholy which does not permit us to look back, but only to forge on. Melancholy, and not nostalgia, is what will finally enable us to reconcile our existence with the absence o f God.
9.
Coda: Irony as response to the tyranny of truth
There exist two basic possible responses to the death o f God. The first is to shudder, step back from the abyss, and hang onto some kind o f truth in order not to lose oneself. The other is to embrace the abyss and treat all attempts to discover truth with a due amount o f irony. The latter seems to be the choice o f what we refer to as postmodern literature.
W hat does it mean to adopt this last option? Kundera's last novel, Im m ortality, is a good example o f this choice. This novel mocks form, turning more in the direction o f anti-form. The reader is introduced to characters that remain marginal and totally unimportant to the plot; she is introduced to philosophical ideas that are not traditionally part o f the novel; the author is overtly introduced into the plot and seemingly has as little control over the novel as have the characters. These elements introduce into the novel a feeling o f playfulness. There is no longer a sense in which the narrator guides the thoughts o f the reader. For that, there has to be an element o f design. Although it is apparent that the author creates the characters, these characters are not created by careful design. They come to life in the author's mind as he is listening to the radio, or sees an arbitrary movement o f the body. Their creation as well as the actions they take part in are governed by pure chance.
With this set o f givens established, the only plausible position that the reader can assume, is an ironic one. Now that we have ascertained that both the author and the reader find themselves adhering to an ironic stance, it is perhaps appropriate to attempt an appraisal o f this stance.
First o f all it is apparent that the ironic stance is a dangerous one. One stands a chance o f losing all established values, moral and aesthetic. Why precisely should this be risked? A first tentative answer would be that it is a more interesting way o f going about living, than just sticking to values which have already been established. At first this answer seems slightly weak and dangerously gung-ho, but, when carefully considered, it seems to deviate very little from the spirit o f the old modernist battle-cry coined by Rimbaud: 'It is necessary to be absolutely modem'. In this sense post modernism seems to be a radicalisation o f modernism, and there is nothing within modernism, with its spirit o f exploration, which seems to forbid such a radicalisation.
But this answer does not bring us far. Kundera's irony, as we have seen, goes a step further than that o f Joyce or Woolf. Both aesthetic form and the writer's authority are undermined by irony. Kundera's postmodernism starts opposing the last vestiges o f truth that modernism never dared part with. The modernist writer is still an authority and in modernist writing aesthetic form still dictates the boundaries o f meaning. The irony of modernism is not prepared to ironise and laugh at itself. This constitutes a form o f textual totalitarianism in which the reader may laugh at what the author says, but never laugh at the author. The author is still the knowing subject who projects a truth which one dares not ridicule or challenge when one is reading. In this respect the creation o f fiction turns into a political matter. Writing, as Derrida asserts, becomes a political act.5 The author can no longer feign to know anything. All s/he is equipped with, is ideas. Whenever these ideas become truths, as opposed to mere possibilities, they become tyrannical and totalitarian.
In many ways my reading o f Kundera is not highly plausible. As far as the character o f the subject and specifically the subject as creator are concerned, Kundera is probably much more o f a modernist than I have attempted to show. This is, however not o f great importance. What is important, is that his texts open themselves to various diverse interpre tations -in fact, they seem to revel in the vulnerability o f their own truths. It is precisely these truths that have to be debated and discussed.
Perhaps it is true that we are risking a concept o f morality in adopting this new freedom. But then it is also clear that this freedom will put an end to the monopolisation o f truth. The meta-morality o f freedom is not unpro blematic, but it promises to test the boundaries o f established moralities and is bound to engender much moral discussion about its own parameters.
